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Tf'E RIGHT OF BAILEE.S.
THE RIGHT OF BAILEES TO CONTRACT
AGAINST LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE.
BETWEEN the law of bailments as it stands today and as it
stood at the ancient common law is fixed a wide and remark-
able gulf, whose broad expanse is bridged only by the ever-
increasing influence through the centuries of the law of contracts.
The object of this article is to trace the progress of the law of
bailments through the past and to study its present status, for the
purpose of prophesying its probable future and discovering the
direction it ought to take.
In the earliest English law there is some question whether the
liability of bailees, including common carriers and others pursuing
common callings, was that of insurance, or simply that of responsi-
bility for negligence. Justice Holmes maintains that the liability of
all bailees was that of insurance, and that the present so-called
common law liability of common carriers and innkeepers is a
fragmentary survival of the earlier law in regard to all bailees.
Professor Beale defends the theory that at first bailees in general
were liable only for negligence, and that the special liability of
common carriers as insurers was established not even by the case
of Coggs v. Bernard,' but by the case of Forward v. Pittard.
2
A middle theory holds that, according to the early law of England,
all bailees pursuing a common calling were liable for some particu-
lar loss as insurers, but only common carriers were absolute insurers,
and then not until the time of Lord Holt and Lord Mansfield; that
all bailees were liable in trespass and detinue (and therefore quasi
insurers) when they had a cause of action over against the wrong-
doer; that after the origin of the writ of trespass on the case
bailees were also liable where they had undertaken to do some-
thing (assumpsit) and were guilty of misfeasance; and that later,
through the confusion of the growing principles of contract with
the old principles of tort they were liable for a mere omission as
well. But, whatever theory be adopted, it is certain that some
time in the history of the common law, by custom and public policy,
1 2 Ld. Raym. 9o8. 2 T. R. 27-
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all bailees became liable both for positive acts of misfeasance
(negligence ?) and for strict neglects, and that some exceptional
bailees were made absolute insurers except for the acts of God
and the public enemy.
1
These common law doctrines, as found in their advanced form,
were inherited by the commonwealths of the United States.2
We start, then, with this common law liability of bailees, - a
liability imposed by the sound public policy of the ages, for
this it was which created the duty on the part of those who re-
ceived property belonging to others to keep it with diligence and
return it or deliver it over at the end of the bailment. Indepen-
dently of the agreement of the parties the law indicated where men
should not be negligent. This marked the climax in the develop-
ment of the principles of tort law so far as the subject of bailments
is concerned. To use the language of evolution, it was the per-
fection of a species. From that time the law worked along
another line, for the development of the species of contract in
bailments. While in early English history, therefore, bailments
was regarded as a tort subject and the duties of the relation were
created by law independently of the agreement of the parties, it
was soon realized that assumpsit was not the legitimate field of
torts. The subject of contracts was made distinct and character-
istic by the successive actions of debt, covenant, and assu ipsit, and
further and further invaded the territory of bailments and carriers,
until now it is natural to ask whether there is longer left in bailments
and carriers any law of torts. Yes, it has not been supplanted.
Its application is sometimes simply co-ordinate with that of con-
tracts, sometimes still exclusive of contracts; but always, in the
absence of agreement, there continues to rest upon the bailees of
the different classes the general duty, created by the common law,
to exercise slight, ordinary, or high diligence, or to insure, as the
1 Holmes, The Common Law, 164-205; Ix HARv. L. REV. I58-168; Coggs v.
Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909; Doorman v. Jenkins, 2 Ad. & El. 256; Schiells v. Black-
burne, i H. Blk. x58; Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N. C. 468; Handford v. Palmer,
2 Brod. & Bing. 359; Searle v. Laverick, L. R. 9 Q. B. 122; Calye's Case, 8 Coke 32;
Forward v. Pittard, i T. R. 27 ; Story, Bailments, § 332.
2 Tracy v. Wood, 3 Mason (U. S.) 132; Eldridge v. Hill, 97 U. S. 92; Preston v.
Prather, 137 U. S. 6o4; Spooner v. Mattoon, 40 Vt. 300; Thompkins v. Saltmarsh,
14 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 275; Wood v. McClure, 7 Ind. 155; Commercial Bank v. Martin,
T La. Ann. 344; Stewart v. Western, etc., Co., 4 Biss. (U. S.) 362; Cutler v. Bonney,
30 Mich. 259; Black v. Chicago, etc., Co., 30 Neb. 197; McPadden v. Central, etc.,
Co., 44 N. Y. 478.
THE RIGHT OF BAILEES.
case may be. So that, ordinarily, a bailor may elect to sue in
either tort or contract. This is right. It registers the common
opinion as to the diligence such parties ought to exercise, and
where they have not particularized as to the diligence they desire,
it prevents the parties from escaping from all diligence. Every
man owes a duty to every other not intentionally, or negligently,
to injure him.'
But a more difficult question concerns us here. Granting that,
in the absence of particular agreement, the tort duties still survive,
if the parties so desire; can and should they be allowed by con-
tract to lay aside all these tort duties and themselves determinejust what their duties, rights, and liabilities to each other shall be?
Answering the first half of the question, so far as English law is
concerned, although there are very few cases involving gratuitous
and ordinary bailees, and the difficulty of tracing the development
of the freedom of contract is consequently enhanced, yet there is
no difficulty in knowing what the final outgrowth of the develop-
ment has been. All liability for negligence may be excused. To
that extent the parties may make any terms they desire.2
In the United States the history of the growth of the power of
contract, like that of all other branches of the law, reveals a condi-
tion of strange perplexity. Every possible holding here finds an
exponent, a champion. While, as in England, most of the in-
stances of contract encroachments occur in connection with the ex-
ceptional bailments, doubtless because of the greater anxiety to get
away from the more stringent common law liability there, yet the
few existing cases on the unexceptional bailments cannot be styled
harmonious. Almost unanimously it is held that bailees may
increase the duty which they would otherwise be under, but to
what extent they may decrease that duty is not clear. However,
if the expression " gross negligence" be understood to include
only wilful acts, probably a majority of the courts in the United
States hold that the parties to the bailments under consideration
may substitute for the common law any liability they may agree
upon, except to excuse fraud, or wilful wrongdoing, or to violate
any positive prohibitions of law. This would allow them to stipu-
late against liability for negligence in any degree.3
I Holmes, The Common Law; Pollock & Maitland, Hist. of Eng. Law; Bigelow,
Torts; State v. Chew Muck You, 20 Ore. 215.
2 Walter v,. Railroad, 2 E. & B. 750; Van Toll v. Railroad, r2 C. B. (N. S.) 75.
3 Lee v. Baldwin, ro Ga. 208; Marks v. New Orleans Cold Storage Co., 107 La.
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This doctrine is squarely held by New York, but the other courts
which have passed upon the question have said they would not
permit exemptions from liability for " gross negligence." Yet, in
spite of the fact that literally negligence is negative and should
exclude the idea of wilfulness, from the way the various tribunals
have employed the words "gross negligence" and the general
thought running throughout the context where they are found, it
seems as though they had in mind some overt act of wilfulness, or
bad faith, or fraud. Otherwise all distinction between the different
bailments would inevitably be abolished. How could there be
any justification for allowing borrowers, pledgees, and hirers of the
different classes to narrow their obligations so as to be liable only
for gross negligence, and not allowing depositaries and mandataries
to change their liability in any particular? There is none. The
courts could not have meant to announce such a principle. The
different degrees of diligence, "high," " ordinary," and "slight,"
are simply the degrees of diligence which the ordinary prudent
man would exercise if he were a bailee of that particular class, and
any failure to exercise that is negligence. Hence it is submitted
that the courts do not intend sometimes to uphold a contract
against negligence and at other times not; that negligence in this
connection is not capable of division; and that what the courts
mean by their exception is wilful, wanton, reckless, or criminal
acts, which they call " gross negligence," though strictly not negli-
gence at all. If this is their true meaning, these decisions in our
country are in harmony with the English and continental holdings.
If it is not their meaning, the statement above as to the weight of
authority in the United States is not correct.'
But, whatever uncertainty there may be as to the actual position
of the courts, there is no uncertainty in the mind of the writer as
172; Conway Bank v. Am. Ex. Co., 8 Allen (Mass.) 516; Smith v. Library Board, 58
Minn. io8; Gashweiler v. Wabash, etc., Co., 83 Mo. 112; Wells v. Porter, 169 Mo. 252;
Kinney v. Central Railroad, 32 N. J. L. 407; Dale v. Lee, 51 N. J. L. 678; Alexander
v. Greene, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 9, 7 Hill (N. Y.) 533; Hollister v. Nowlen, 19 Wend. (N. Y.)
234; Wells v. Steam. Nay. Co., 8 N. Y. 375; Moeran v. New York, etc., Co., 59 N.Y.
Supp. 584; Nat. Cash Reg. v. Callais, 84 N. Y. Supp. x66. Contra, Lancaster v.
Smith, 62 Pa. St. 47. See also Memphis, etc., Co. v. Jones, 39 Tenn. 517; Direct
Nay. Co. v. Davidson, 74 S. W. Rep. 790; Kimball v. Rutland, etc., Co., 26 Vt. 247 ;
Story, Bailments, §§ 19, 22, 31, 32, 66, 182a, 238; Lawson, Bailments, § 13; Schouler,
Bailments and Carriers, § 2o ; Hutchinson, Carriers, §§ i4, 4o.
1 Omaha, etc., Co. v. Chollette, 33 Neb. 143; Stringer v. Alabama, etc., Co., 99 Ala.
397; Kentucky, etc., Co. v. Gastineau, 83 Ky. 119; Louisville v. Filbern, 6 Bush
(Ky.) 574-
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to what ought to be their position. Progress among men has ever
been from status to contract. It is the common judgment of man-
kind that it is best for the individual and the race to have freedom
of contract indulged so far as possible. Therefore I maintain that,
on general principles, parties should be allowed freedom of con-
tract here, and thus contract for exemption from liability for negli-
gence if they desire. Of course, if there is any rule of public
policy that would be violated, this should not be allowed. But is
there any rule of public policy which would object to contracts of
this kind by ordinary bailees, - that is, those pursuing avocations
not affected with a public use or interest? The duties and obliga-
tions of these bailments cannot be thrown upon the bailees without
their consent, and this being so, if they do consent to assume the
duties, why should they not have the right to determine the nature
of the same in every respect, and their responsibility for neglect
thereof? It is true that such a contract might be a bad one for
one of the parties, but so any contract that may be made is liable
to be. Public policy does not yet forbid bad bargains. On the
other hand, does it not seem like a harsh rule which, in addition to
the gratuitous care of property, will make a depositary and man-
datary liable for even gross negligence in spite of the stipulation of
the parties? For the moment we will consider only the question
of contracting against negligence, not including wilful and wanton
acts, but using the term in its appropriate sense, in the words
of Mr. Cooley, "the failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury." Public policy forbids only such con-
tracts as are opposed to the public will, or tend to subvert the
public welfare, like those tending to immorality, or to deprive the
public of the services of citizens, or to influence the public service,
or to interfere with public justice. A contract of the kind under
consideration bears no resemblance to any of these. It has no
tendency to be injurious to the public, or against the public good;
nor would any principle of public welfare or morality be infringed.
It would seem as though there could be but one answer to a ques-
tion of this sort, and that is that public policy makes no objection
whatever, as found in either legislation or common law, for the
contract is concerned only with the property rights of the individ-
uals to the contract. Public policy is in its nature uncertain and
incapable of being defined with exactness; aud where the contract
302 HARVARD LA W REVIEW.
is not prohibited by constitution or statute the extension of the
principle should be carefully guarded.1
So much for the contract aspect of the subject. Let us now look
at its tort aspect. Here the argument from analogy is equally
strong, for so far as the allowance of exemptions from liability is
concerned the principles of the tort of negligence ought not to be
different from those of other comparable torts. In other torts, it
is well established, consent is always a good defense to an action.
More than this, consent is even sometimes a defense to criminal
prosecution. This is on the principle that that to which a person
consents is not esteemed in law an injury. Volenti nonfit injuria.
In a suit, or indictment, for false imprisonment, if it can be
shown that the act was done with the consent of the party com-
plaining, that is a complete bar to all proceedings.
2 In an action
for slander, or libel, all that the defendant need show by way of
defense is consent to publication; even an agreement to accept al
apology is sufficien. The principle was well established at the
common law that a tenant could protect himself against an action
for waste by a contract "without impeachment of waste."
4 To
an action of trespass, acquiescence, special contract, or leave and
license, was always such justification as to defeat recovery.5 In the
same way consent is a complete defense to a suit for conversion,
6 or
nuisance,7 or an assault and battery, unless the latter amounts to an
injury to the public as well as to the individual, as in case of breach
of the peace, when public policy renders the consent illegal.
8
Likewise, in the English and some American courts, it has been
held that by an express contract, or an implied one, a servant may
release his master from all liability to the servant, where statutes
1 Egerton v. Brownland, 4 H. L. Cas. x; Printing, etc., Co. v. Sampson, L. R. 19
Eq. 462, 465; Teal v. Walker, Iii U. S. 242; United States v. Trans-Missouri, etc.,
Co., 7o Fed. Rep. 2oi; Peterson v. Christiansen, 26 Minn. 377; Houlton v. Nichol,
93 Wis. 393.
2 Floyd v. State, 12 Ark. 43; Berry v. Adamson, 6 B. & C. 528; Ellis v. Cleveland,
54 Vt. 437.
3 Lanea. Applegate, i Stark. N. P. 9 7 ; Boosey v. Wood, 3 H. & C. 484; Schoupflin
v. Coffey, 162 N. Y. z2.
4 Garth v. Cotton, i Ves. 524; Bowles' Case, ii Coke 8z b.
5 Low v. Nettles, 2 Bailey (S. C.) 447; Windle v'. Crescent, etc., Co., z86 Pa. St.
224; Lambert v. Robinson, 162 Mass. 34.
6 Powell v. Hoyland, L. R. 6 Exch. 67; Powers v. Klenze, 15 Mont. 177.
7 Burkam v. Ohio, etc., Co., i2" Ind. 344; Woodward v. Seeley, I, Ill. 157; White
v. Manhattan, etc., Co., 139 N. V. 19.
s State v. Beck, i Hill (N. V.) 363; O'Brien v. Cunard, etc., Co., i54 Mass. 272.
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have not expressly forbidden it; although, if public policy were
ever going to speak, it ought to be here, because of the interest
which the state has in the servant as a citizen, who ought to be
guarded from danger. But such a contract may be made either
before the employment begins, or afterwards, or after the injury, if
based upon sufficient consideration.'
If consent is allowed to destroy a person's cause of action in all
the foregoing torts, why not in the case of the tort of negligence?
And if consent will destroy the tort liability, where is the logic for
the objection to a contract destroying, modifying, or supplanting
that tort liability?
It, should be noted at this point that in the illustrations herein-
before referred to the consent and the contracts have affected only
the parties thereto. The moment they affect third parties public
policy steps in and declares them illegal, so that any contract to
get a person to commit any of the torts enumerated would be void,
whether the tort was negligence, or assault, or battery, or slander,
or libel, or waste, or false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution,
or conversion, or nuisance, or trespass. An agreement which con-
templates a civil wrong to a third person is illegal 2
In conclusion, then, it is my judgment that in the bailments of
deposit, mandate, commodatum, pledges and pawns, and the ordi-
nary hirings, all the bailees should be allowed to exempt them-
selves from liability for negligence, whether it be called "slight,"
"ordinary," or "gross," unless prohibited by special statutory enact-
ments, provided that is the plain meaning of the contract; and as to
exemption from liability for other acts than those which are negli-
gent, the general principles of torts, as indicated above, should be
applied. However, up to the present time, all that we can say is
that the cases in New York, England, and some other foreign
countries, where the civil law has more influence, have gone as
far as this. But the great majority of the holdings in this country
lean in this direction, and the law of bailments has not yet reached
its final form; so that, judging by the direction of its change and
progress in the past, it may be prophesied that some time in the
future it will be allowed to bailees of these classes to make as broad
1 Otis v. Penn. Co., 7i Fed. Rep. 136; Western, etc., Co. v. Bishop, So Ga. 465;
Fulton, etc., Co. v. Wilson, 89 Ga. 318; Purdy v. Rome, 125 N. Y. 209; 2oAm. & Eng.
Enc. x56.
2 Scott v. Brown, L. R. z Q. B. 724; Woodstock, etc., Co. v. Extension, etc., Co.,
129 U. S. 643; W. Va. Trans. Co. v. Pipe-Line Co., 22 W. Va. 6oo.
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contracts as those referred to above, and to limit their common law
liability of tort on the same principles as all other tort-feasors.
When we come to common carriers, innkeepers, and other
bailees affected with a public interest, a different question confronts
us. In regard to these two considerations may enter. One is the
fact that a public interest may be involved. These occupations
and enterprises may involve the safety of the lives of the citizens
of the state, reasonableness of rates, unjust discriminations, and
other matters affecting the general public in addition to the private
parties who may make the contract. The other consideration
follows from this. Because of these public interests the public has
a right to control and regulate the businesses and to restrict the
freedom of contract. In other words, public policy applies here as
it did not in the other bailments. In guarding these public inter-
ests, in England and in this country from the time of its earliest
colonization, it has been the immemorial law that the public has a
right to regulate stage lines, ferries, hackmen, railways, wharf-
ingers, auctioneers, innkeepers, bakers, millers, and the like, and
in so doing to fix a maximum charge for services rendered, accom-
modations furnished, and articles sold, although as to some of them
the public had conferred no franchise. This law of the ages has
been reaffirmed and recognized by the Supreme Court of the
United States.' With especial force should this right be applied to
those monopolies which have the breath of life breathed into them
by legislative act and have vested in them the power of eminent
domain to take private property for their use, which under our
Constitution must be for a public purpose. But the right of the
public to regulate is not restricted to these enterprises, but applies
to all affected with a public use. Under this principle the right of
regulation has been invoked against water companies, cotton
presses, general warehouses, street railways, canals, ferries, toll
roads and bridges, wharves, telephones, telegraphs, gas companies,
tolls of mills, salvage of logs, etc.
This makes a great distinction between bailees whose business is
I Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 516.
2 Spring Valley v. Schottler, ixo U. S. 347; Delaware v. Stockyards, 45 N. J. Eq.
50; Buffalo, etc., Co. v. Buffalo, Iii N. Y. 132; Perrine v. Canal 
Co., 9 How. (U. S.)
172; Parker v. Railroad, xo9 Mass. 5o6; Covingtonv. Sanford, 
164 U. S. 578; Ouacheta
v. Aiken, 12 U. S. 444; Mayo v. Tel. Co., 112 N. C- 343; Toledo v. Gas 
Co., 5 Oh.
St. 557; State v. Edwards, 86 Me. xo2; West Branchv. Fisher, 
150 Pa. St. 475; 31 Am.
L. Rev. 655.
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affected with a public interest and those whose business is not thus
affected. Where in the one case it might not be against publicpolicy to permit contracts to exempt them from liability for negli-gence, in the other case it might be directly opposed to publicpolicy. Where in the one case public policy would favor theprinciple of freedom of contract, in the other case it would be op-posed to that principle for the reason that the public is a thirdparty to all such contracts and has interests therein which must beprotected. Bearing this distinction in mind, let us proceed to con-
sider the question whether these exceptional bailees should be al-lowed to limit their liability for negligence. If the interests of thepublic could be as fully protected and safeguarded in this way as
any other, I suppose all will admit that the best rule would bethat permitting such bailees as great freedom of contract as otherbailees. What rule, then, will best conserve the interests of the
public?
The true reason for the extraordinary common law liability of
common carriers and innkeepers for the safety of goods was thepossibility of collusion, of combining with thieves against those
trusting them. In the early days of the law this was a very greatpossibility and probability, but at the present time the reason has
ceased to exist The reason for the rule having fallen, should not
the rule itself fall? This argument may have force as applied toinnkeepers, but, owing to the nature of the business of common
carriers, it is perhaps to be admitted that as to them there are new
reasons for the extraordinary liability, as now modified, which are
as strong as the old reason.1
The course of the law of innkeepers has been much the same
as that of other bailees. After a period of development their ex-traordinary liability for the goods of a guest and their ordinary
negligence liability for the safety of the person of the guest were
established as their common law liability. From the time of the
establishment of this rule the tendency of the law has been towardbreaking it down by permitting limitations on it. But in thisprocess, while some of the changes have been wrought out by the
allowance of notices and special contracts of the parties, most ofthe limitations have been those resulting from statutory enact-
ments. By analogy it is reasonable to suppose that at least as ex-tensive contract limitations would be allowed to innkeepers as have
1 Story, Bailments, §§ 464-467; ir HARM. L. REv. r58; 30 Am. L. Rev. 767.
20
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been allowed to common carriers (their common law liability being
less). But, ordinarily by statute, they can escape liability for
goods by posting notices only when the goods have not been de-
posited with them for custody as required by the notices.
1
The Roman law made livery-stable keepers insurers and classed
them with innkeepers and carriers, but the English law has refused
to apply the doctrines to livery-stablers; nor are warehousemen,
or other bailees affected with a public interest, insurers. Only inn-
keepers and common carriers are made approximately insurers.
But whatever reasons for this liability exist today, they apply with
the same force to these other public bailees as to innkeepers, and
it would seem as though the rule ought to be relaxed in the one
case or made more rigid in the other.
The history of the right of common carriers to contract against
liability for negligence discloses a strange variety of holdings, both
in the case of common carriers of goods and of passengers, for the
similarity of principles and the fact that the same parties are
generally engaged in both occupations sanction their treatment
together. In general, as in the bailments heretofore considered,
there has been an ever-increasing tendency, more marked here
than in any other bailment, to allow special contracts to take the
place of the common law liability. Little by little there has been
a gradual breaking away from the harsh common law principle
which made common carriers insurers except for the acts of God
and the public enemy. Their common law liability itself has been
lessened by the admission of other exceptions to it, where the loss
resulted from the inherent nature of the goods or live stock, public
authority and act of the shipper. But special contract exemptions
have worn still further into the common law liability. In this
manner common carriers have been allowed to determine the time
of delivery of goods and the route of transportation, to exempt
themselves from loss by fire, breakage, leakage, etc., when not due
to their neglect, to limit the time to present claims and the amount
recoverable in case of loss, to impose conditions and restrictions
1 Dawson v. Chamney, 5 Ad. & El. x64; Richmond v. Smith, 8 B. & C. 9; Pinkerton
v. Woodward, 33 Cal. 557; Bodwell v. Bragg & Bro., 29 Ia. 232; Berkshire v. Proctor
et al., 7 Cush. (Mass.) 417; Fuller v'. Coates et al., z8 Oh. St. 343; McDaniels v,.
Robinson, 26 Vt. 316; Story, Bailments, § 486; Rev. Stat. of Ill. 1903, c. 7T, § 2;
Rev. Stat. of Me. 1903, C. 29, § 7; Comp. L. of Mich. 1897, §§ 5315, 5316, Rev. Stat.
of Mass. 19o2, 86z, 863; Rev. Stat. of Minn. s9o5, § 2810; Rev. Stat. of N. Y. i9or,
1744, 1746.
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on passengers, and in a word to do anything that did not excuse
negligence, until at last even the question of permitting them to
contract against responsibility for the results of their negligence
has arisen. On the rock of this question the courts have split
asunder.'
So far as English common carriers are concerned, early glimmers
of the right to establish by contract the liability they should be
under are found as far back as Southcote's case,2 where it was
hinted that such a carrier might have provided against liability. In
Morse v. Slue 3 it was said he " might have made a caution." In
later cases it was held that by a notice brought home a common
carrier could create a special acceptance, which, except for mis-
feasance, would control his liability in every respect. By the Land
Carriers' Act of 1830 this notice feature was practJcally abolished.
but the rule was still recognized that by a special contract the
carrier could stipulate against liability for any loss, where there
was no wilful wrongdoing, whether it related to goods or passen-
gers, and whether it was caused by his negligence or not. The
Railway and Canal Traffic Act was then passed, and by this it was
grovided that any agreement limiting a carrier's liability must be
signed by the shipper and be adjudged by a court to be just and
reasonable; but if these conditions are met a common carrier may
make a contract which will excuse him from liability for all negli-
gence, though not for wilful wrong.
4
Hence it is seen that, by the law of England, common carriers,
like all other bailees, may by contract do away with all of their
common law liability except that which may be called their pure
tort liability for positive wrongdoing.
The English rules are followed in Canada, Scotland, Germany,
Italy, and in some of the states in our own country.
5
1 Hart v. Pennsylvania, X12 U. S.331; Liverpool v. Phenix, 129 U. S.397; Express
Co. v. Caldwell, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 264; Boylon v. Hot Springs, 132 U. S. 146; Louis-
ville v. Sherrod, 84 Ala. 178; Duntley v. Railroad, 66 N. H. 263; Graves v. Lake
Shore, 137 Mass. 33; O'Malley v. Great Northern, 86 Minn. 380; U. S. Express v.
Backman, 28 Oh. St. 144; Richmond v. Payne, 86 Va. 481.
2 4 Co. 84.
8 1 Vent. 238.
4 Gibbon v. Paynton, 4 Burr. 2298; Forward v. Pittard, T T. R. 27 ; Nicholdson v'.
Willan, 5 East 507; Smith v. Home, 8 Taunt. 144; Chippendale v. Lancashire, 12
L. J. C. B. 22; Manchester v. Brown, 8 App. Cas. 70; Hinton v. Dibbin, 2 Q. B. 646;
McCawley v. Furness, L. R. 8 Q. B. 57; Blake v. Great Western, 31 L. J. Exch. 346.
6 The Glengoil, etc., Co. v. Pilkerton, 28 Can. Sup. Ct. 146; Bicknell v. Grand
Trunk, 26 Ont. App. 431; Henderson v. Stevenson, L. R. 2 H. L. 470.
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The extreme holding in the United States is that permitting the
absolute change and extinguishment of the common law liability
by contract, if the parties so desire and agree. This view is taken
practically only by the jurisdiction of New York. In that state the
pendulum has swung to both extremes. At first it was held that a
common carrier could not by contract or otherwise evade the duty
thrown upon it by the common law; but after a period of develop-
ment and expressions of opinion by the federal Supreme Court
the courts of the State of New York swung back to enforce any
contract the parties might see fit to make, provided the lan-
guage of the contract is plain and distinct, though by his wilful
wrongdoing the carrier may render himself liable for breach of
contract.'
The theory of the New York court is that the contract between
the shipper or passenger, on the one side, and the carrier, on the
other, is purely a private one, with which the public has no concern,
and that public policy is satisfied by holding the carrier bound to
carry under his common law obligation if the shipper or passen-
ger insists upon it and will pay the regular freight or passenger
rate.
Next in liberality are some holdings exempting the carrier from
liability for negligence to one riding on a free pass, or to an express
messenger, or sleeping-car agents, - the entering wedge for the free
pass decisions, so far as the United States Supreme Court is con-
cerned, having been driven in the express messenger cases.2 This
rule, of course, refers to only a part of the carrier service.
The next most liberal holding, followed by some courts, is that
permitting the common carrier by contract to provide against all
liability, except for injury occasioned by fraud or gross negligence,
whether to goods or passengers, provided there is a reduction in
the freight or passenger rate to constitute a consideration for the
agreement; and it is a question whether with these decisions should
1 Gould v. Hill, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 623; Nelson v. Hudson, etc., Co., 48 N. Y. 498;
Keeney v. Grand Trunk, etc., Co., 47 N. Y. 525; Cragin et at. v. New York Central,
5 N. Y. 61; Gleadell v. Thomson et at., 56 N. Y. 194; Bissell v. New York, etc., Co.,
25 N. Y. 442; Ulrich v. Railroad, xo8 N. Y. So.
2 Baltimore v. Voight, 176 U. S. 498; Northern Pacific, etc., Co. v. Adams, 192
U. S. 44o; Griswold v. New York, etc., Co., 53 Conn. 37r; Blank v. Illinois, x82 Ill.
332; Rogers v. Kennebec, etc., Co., 86 Me. 261 ; Quimby v. Boston, etc., Co., xo
Mass. 265; Bates v,. Old Colony, etc., Co., 147 Mass. 255; Brewer v. New York, etc.,
Co., 124 N. Y. 59; Muldoon v. Seattle, io Wash. 31 r; Russell v. Pittsburg, etc., Co.,
157 Ind. 305; 6 Cyc. 579.
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not also be placed those permitting exemptions from liability to
persons riding on free passes.
1
The New Jersey decisions, though to be classed here, allow com-
mon carriers to contract against the negligence of their agents and
servants but not against their own negligence, a position demolished
as long ago as the case of Railroad v. Lockwood, supra, where the
court pointed out that a common carrier is an artificial being which
can act only through agents and servants, and if it should be al-
lowed to relieve itself from the negligence of one class of servants
it should from the negligence of others. Such reasoning is on a par
with the recently advanced argument by analogy that the state
should proceed against the property of a corporation, instead of
trying to hold its officers personally liable, for analogy would re-
quire that, instead of being tied up and held idle, the property be
made to produce something for the state, as criminals are made
to do.2
In the cases which sustain the foregoing gross negligence excep-
tion, there arises again the question of the meaning of the term. If
the courts really mean negligence, the epithet is technically a mis-
nomer; if they mean acts which would constitute some other
tort, that is another matter entirely. If the latter interpretation
were adopted, all the cases thus far considered could be harmonized
and placed in one and the same category, namely, the cases al-
lowing exemptions from negligence of all kinds, all except gross
negligence and all in the cases of express messengers, sleeping-car
agents, and persons riding on free passes. If this interpretation is
not correct, and I hardly think it would be acceptable to the courts
which have used the language, the cases cannot be harmonized.
'Ihe confusion here is analogous to that discovered in the unexcep-
tional bailments.
But, even though the cases permitting these contracts against
negligence could be harmonized, aside from the free pass doctrine,
the great majority of the courts in this country, up to this time,
have declared against the right of common carriers to make con-
' Northern Pacific, etc., Co. v. Adams, 192 U. S. 44o; Boering v. Railway, etc., Co.,
193 U. S. 442; Cooper v. Raleigh, etc., Co., iio Ga. 659; The Southern Express 
v.
Barnes, 36 Ga. 532; Illinois Central v. Read, 37 Ill. 484; Toledo, etc., Co. v. Biggs, 85
Ill. So; Wabash, etc., Co. v. Browne, 152 Ill. 484; Higgins v. New Orleans, etc., Co.,
28 La. Ann. 133; Wilson v. Shulkin, 51 N. C. 375; Muer v. Chicago, etc., Co., 5 S. D.
568; Amas, etc., Co. v. Railroad, etc., Co., 67 Wis. 46; Black v. Goodrich, 55 Wis
319.
2 Kinney et al. v. Central Railroad, 32 N. J. L. 407.
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tracts exempting themselves from liability for negligence, in any
degree, whether in the carriage of goods or of passengers. 1 It is
true that a majority of our courts support the right of common
carriers to limit their liability to parties riding on free passes, either
absolutely or except for gross negligence; but there is some oppo-
sition to this doctrine, in either view, manifesting itself in Alabama,
Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Texas, sometimes on
common law grounds, sometimes in statutory enactments, and the
free pass cases anyway can be differentiated, made an exception,
and upheld on the ground that public policy would discourage the
issuance of such passes.2
The reasons given for the majority holding are, in the carriage
of goods, (I) the inequality in the position of the contracting
parties. The carrier enjoys a quasi monopoly, and though the
shipper can always insist upon the common law liability or avoid
an unfair contract if procured through duress or fraud, yet his
remedy is so vexatious and tedious that in the long run the carrier
would gain the advantage and be able to set the public at defiance.
(2) These companies are in the nature of quasi-public institutions,
discharging some of the sovereign functions which appropriately
belong to the state, and therefore they owe a duty to the public
which they cannot avoid by private contract any more than other
public officials. In the carriage of passengers the reason for the
rule of the majority is the interest which the state, as1arenspatrzia,
has in the life and health of its citizens.
We have admitted that if it were a purely private matter between
the shipper or passenger and carrier, as the New York courts
maintain, absolute freedom of contract would be the best rule.
Granting the public interest, it may be urged in favor of freedom
I Railroad v. Lockwood, 84 U. S. 357; N. J. Steam. Co. v. Mer. Bank, 6 How.
(U. S.) 344; York Co. v. Central Railroad, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 107; Baltimore v.
McLaughlin, 73 Fed. Rep. 519; The South, etc., Co. v. Henlein et at., 52 Ala. 6o6; Cali-
fornia, etc., Co. v. Railroad, etc., Co., 113 Cal. 329; Camp v. The Hartford, etc.,
Co., 43 Conn. 333; Rose v. The Des Moines, etc., Co., 39 Ia. 246; Kallam v. U. S.
Express, 3 Kan. 198; McCoy v. Erie, 42 Md. 498; Illinois, etc., Co. v. Crudup, 63
Miss. 291; Hull v. Railroad, 41 Minn. 51o; Graham & Co. v. Davis & Co., 4 Oh. St.
362; Piedmont, etc., Co. v. Railroad, 19 S. C. 353; Franham v. The Camden, etc., Co.,
55 Pa. St. 53; Railroad v. Gilbert et at., 88 Tenn. 43o; So. Kan., etc., Co. v. Burgess,
90 S. W. Rep. i89; Virginia, etc., Co. v. Sayers, 26 Gratt. (Va.) 328.
2 Mobile v. Hopkins, 4 Ala. 486; Rose v. Des Moines, etc., Co., 39 Ia. 246; Jaco-
bus v. St. Paul, etc., Co., 2o Minn. 125; Starr v,. Great Northern, etc., Co., 67 Minn.
18; Bryan v'. Missouri, etc., Co., 32 Mo. Ap. 228; Camden v. Bausch, 7 Atl. Rep. 731;
Gulf a,. McGowan, 65 Tex. 640.
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of contract to relax and modify the strict rule of responsibility that
it would enable carriers to reduce their rates of compensation
(surely a public benefit), and if this did not lead to the introduc-
tion of new evils, against which it is the policy of the law to guard,
it is of course an end to be sought.' But the danger of leading in
other serious evils is very great, wellnigh inevitable. The condi-
tion of our carrier service is bad enough under existing conditions;
a relaxation of liability which would tend to make it more careless,
more unobliging, more dangerous, would be intolerable. Again, it
may be claimed, a common carrier ought not to be made an in-
surer without the rights of an insurer; that the only resemblance
his business bears to the insurance business is his liability; and
that it seems especially harsh and unjustifiable to hold the common
carrier liable for the frauds perpetrated on the consignor by third
parties.2 The answer to this objection is that, if it is necessary to
protect the interests of the public, the public, without other reason,
has a right to impose even such a liability as a condition to the
exercise of the carrier's franchise.
In view of all these considerations and of the methods by which
at the present time common carriers must carry on their business,
it seems to me it is against public policy to allow a common carrier
to contract away its liability for negligence either in the carriage of
goods or of passengers; but that public policy would not prohibit
such contracts, clearly, in the case of the simple bailments not
affected with a public interest, nor even in the case of innkeepers
and other bailees affected with a public interest. The cases and
legislation supporting these propositions have the better reasoning.
However, in the instance of common carriers, it must be admitted,
as should be expected, the tendency of the law seems to be slowly
the other way, towards the allowance of special contracts. Express
messengers and persons riding on free passes may now make such
contracts, a great many courts allow still further latitude, and in
the future progress of the law the doctrine may encroach into the
territory of passengers for hire and the territory of goods and live
stock. But it does not seem as though the time were yet ripe for
such changes, and haste in this direction should be made slowly.
Before the clamor of private convenience is listened to it should be
certainly and definitely decided that the interests of the public are
1 Railroad v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 357.
2 9 Alb. L. J. 301.
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safeguarded. The effect of letting the bars of public policy down
and the freedom of contract in, where that policy has been tried,
has not proven, an unquestioned and indisputable success. The
legislation in England registers the protest of the English people
against the interpretations of the courts. Dissatisfaction is felt in New
York. It is not alone the fact that common carriers are pursuing
a public employment that should prevent their making contracts
limiting their liability for negligence, - there are other public em-
ployments perfectly compatible with absolute limitations of such
liability; - it is more because of the magnitude of the business, its
monopolistic character, and the conditions and dangers surrounding
its management.
The bridge, which we saw stretching ahead of us at the beginning,
we have now crossed, and I think I have indicated where, with
the widening of the gulf, it is destined, or at least ought, to be
extended.
Hugh Evander Willis.
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